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POLITICAL SUBDIVISION LIABILITY IN NORTH
DAKOTA: CURRENT STATUS, FUTURE PROSPECTS
CAROLE (HUSEBY) OLSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
One supposedly ordinary event gave the men and women who
run North Dakota's political subdivisions one of the biggest
surprises they encountered in 1985 - the opening of the price
quotes for their liability insurance premium. Cities, counties, park
districts, school districts, and even townships were hit with sharp
price increases in their liability insurance coverage. The cost of
coverage often rose several times the 1984 premium rate and some
political subdivisions found it difficult to secure coverage at any
price.' These soaring prices created a certain amount of budget
chaos as funds earmarked for other purposes had to be diverted to
pay the liability insurance premium. Political subdivision leaders
throughout the state found themselves addressing questions that
confront public officials throughout the country: how much
insurance coverage is necessary, how do we pay for the coverage,
and, inevitably, what can be done to address this problem?
The most frequently offered long term solution to the political
subdivision insurance crisis is tort reform.2 Advocates of tort
reform assert that by restricting the liability exposure of political
subdivisions the number of claims and judgments against political
subdivisions will be reduced, and consequently insurance
premiums will decline. 3
The North Dakota Legislature has displayed an interest in tort
B. S., Valley City State College, Valley City, North Dakota, 1978;.J.D., University of North
Dakota, 1984: North Dakota Supreme Court Law Clerk, 1984-85; Assistant Attorney General,
North Dakota Insurance Department, 1985-86; currently Associate Counsel, National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), Kansas City, Missouri.
I. For a graphic illustration ofthe rise in liability insurance premiums, see infra note 128.
2. See Comment, Municipal Tort Liabiliy for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National Survey,
58 WASH. I. RF.v. 537, 562 (1983) (recommending legislative control of municipal tort liability).
3. See id.
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reform. In the final days of the forty-ninth legislative session, the
House of Representatives considered a bill that would have
immunized political subdivisions from all civil liability except
actions in which damages arose out of the operation of a motor
vehicle. 4 The bill passed initially by a vote of fifty-seven to forty-
six.5 However, the house subsequently reconsidered the bill and
defeated it.6 Presently, the issue of tort reform as applied to political
subdivisions is under scrutiny by a Legislative Council Interim
Judiciary Committee.7
The purpose of this Article is to place the present status of the
liability exposure of North Dakota's political subdivisions in
historical perspective, and to advance measured reforms that will
improve the standing of political subdivisions from an insurance
underwriting perspective. At the outset, it must be noted that any
restrictions on an individual's right to pursue recovery for damages
arising from a tort must be carefully considered before
implementation. Budget pressures arising from premium increases
do not justify unqualified return to governmental immunity for
political subdivisions, nor piecemeal changes that inequitably pare
back the risk exposure of political subdivisions.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN NORTH DAKOTA
In order to understand the present status of political
subdivision liability in North Dakota, it is helpful to review the rise
and fall of governmental immunity in this state. The doctrine of
governmental immunity is associated with the ancient maxim rex
non protest peccare, or in English - "the King can do no wrong.' '8
This principle of state immunity was extended to the forerunner of
modern political subdivisions in the English case of Russel v. Men of
Devon. 9
4. H.B. 1659, 49th Legis. Assembly (1985).
5. 49th Legis. Assembly, House Journal at 2451.
6. Id. at 2535.
7. See Political Subdivision Immunity Study, ch. 851, 1985 N.D. Laws 2521 (directing a study
concerning governmental immunity, liability insurance for political subdivisions, and the
desirability of a tort claims act); see also Public Employee Liability Insurance Study, ch. 769, 1985
N.D. Laws 2404 (directing a study of liability insurance for political subdivisions).
8. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE.LAW OF TORTS S 131, at 1033 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER]; Comment, supra note 2, at 538; see also E. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36
YALE L.J. 1 (1926) (discussing the historical development of the doctrine of governmental
immunity).
9. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (i788).
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Because no legal entity existed, the plaintiffs in Russel sued the
residents of the county of Devon. 10 The court in Russel refused to
allow recovery against an unincorporated county, citing the
injustice that would result from ordering payment when no fund
existed."1 The court decided that the individual plaintiff was better
equipped to sustain the loss than was the public.I2 The common law
that developed in the United States on this issue began with Mower
v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 13 an 1812 Massachusetts decision based on
the Russel case. The basic rule derived from Mower is that political
subdivisions created by the state legislature are not liable in tort
unless a statute specifically provides for liability. 14
In North Dakota, the concept of governmental immunity
emerged in 1844 from the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision
in Larson v. City of Grand Forks. 15 In Larson, however, the court
declined to afford immunity to the city.' 6 Instead, the court held
that municipal corporations are responsible for lack of reasonable
care in maintaining their streets, sidewalks, and highways. 7 The
defense of governmental immunity was asserted again in the 1893
case entitled Ludlow v. City of Fargo. 18 In Ludlow the court reaffirmed
Larson and determined that municipal corporations are liable for
tortious acts even though no statute authorized suit. 19
While municipal corporations suffered liability in tort, quasi-
municipal corporations did not. 20 In Vail v. Town of Amenia 2 the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that quasi-municipal
corporations, such as counties, townships, and school districts,
enjoyed immunity from tort liability for performance of their
10. Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359,359 (1788).
11. Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362.
12. See id.
13. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). In Mower the plaintiff sued the inhabitants of Leicester, alleging
negligent failure to maintain a bridge. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812).
14. See id.
15.3 Dak. 307, 19 N.W. 414(1884).
16. Larson v. City ofGrand Forks, 3 Dak. 307, 313, 19 N.W. 414, 416 (1884).
17. Id. The court upheld an award of S1500 to the plaintiff for a broken leg caused by the fall of
an awning overhanging a city sidewalk. Id. at 311, 314, 19 N.W. at 415, 416; see also Maloney v. City
of Grand Forks, 73 N.D. 445, 15 N.W.2d 769 (1944) (city liable for injuries to pedestrian incurred
while walking on sidewalk).
18.3 N.D. 485, 57 N.W. 506(1893). In Ludlow the plaintiff sued for injuries sustained when her
carriage fell into an unguarded ditch that had been dug by city employees. Ludlow v. City of Fargo,
3 N.D. 485, 487, 57 N.W. 506, 507 (1893).
19. Id. at 492, 57 N.W. at 509.
20. See Vail v. Town of Amenia, 4 N.D. 239, 243, 250, 59 N.W. 1092, 1093, 1096 (1894)
(distinguishing between municipal and quasi-municipal corporations, and finding no liability for a
township's failure to maintain a bridge), overruled, Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D.
1974). For a discussion of Kitto, see infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
21. 4 N.D. 239, 59 N.W. 1092 (1894), overruled, Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W'2d 795
(N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Kito, see infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
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governmental functions. 22 In Vail the court reasoned that townships
which are not engaged in a corporate purpose should not be held
liable in tort. 23
Over the years, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court
developed exceptions to the general rules of immunity for quasi-
municipal corporations and liability for municipal corporations.
For example, in Township of Noble v. Aasen24 the court held that the
taking of private property for a public use without compensation
justified the imposition of liability against quasi-municipal
corporations. 25 In Montain v. City of Fargo26 the court introduced an
exception to municipal corporation liability. The court drew a
distinction between governmental functions and proprietary;
functions. 2" The court indicated that a city was entitled to
immunity with respect to its governmental functions but not with
respect to its proprietary functions. 28
The basis of the distinction between proprietary and
governmental functions is the dual character of municipal
corporations. 29 Municipal corporations act in two capacities:
governmental (sometimes referred to as public or political) and
proprietary (also referred to as private or corporate). 30 In their
proprietary capacity, municipal corporations are subject to liability
in the same manner as any private corporation. 31 The following
activities have been considered "proprietary": The operation of a
22. See Vail v. Town ofAmenia, 4 N.D. 239, 250, 59 N.W. 1092, 1096(1894), overruled, Kitto v.
Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Kilo, see infra notes 56-73 and
accompanying text. The court in Vail specifically reserved the issue of liability arising from the
exercise -of purey corporate functions. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between governmental
and corporate (or "proprietary") functions, see infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 249-50, 59 N.W. at 1095-96. The court noted that a municipal corporation is created
by the residents primarily for the advantage and convenience of its people. Id. at 249, 59 N.W. at
1095. In contrast, a quasi-municipal corporation, such as a county or township, is created by the
state for the purpose of carrying out the policy of the state. Id. These quasi-municipal corporations
become agents of the state when performing a government function, and share with the state
immunity from tort liability. Id.
24. 8 N.D. 77, 76 N.W. 990(1898).
25. Township of Noble v. Aasen, 8 N.D. 77, 80, 76 N.W. 990,992 (1898).
26. 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416 (1917), overruled, Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795
(N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Kitto, see infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
27. Montain v. City of Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 442, 166 N.W. 416, 417 (1917), overruled, Kitto v.
Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Kilto, see infra notes 56-73 and
accompanying text.
28. See id. at 442-43, 166 N.W. at 417. The court concluded that garbage removal constituted a
governmental function; thus, the city was not liable for an accident involving a garbage sled. Id. at
442, 166 N.W. at 417-18.
29. C. RHYNE, THE.LAw OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 5 32.2, at 1042 (1980).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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hospital, 32 the operation and maintenance of an airport,"3 the
operaion and maintenance of a public parking garage, 34 and the
operation and maintenance of public utilities.3" Examples of
activities traditionally considered governmental functions, for
which there is no liability, include the following: The
establishment, operation, and maintenance of a municipal police
department, 36 the operation of a public school, 37 the condemnation
of property,38 and the issuance of permits. 39
A fine line hovers between governmental functions and
proprietary functions, however. 40 Because of the recent trend
toward imposition of liability, the tendency is to characterize an act
as proprietary. 41 A considerable amount of confusion and
inconsistency exists among the decisions rendered on this issue, and
abandonment of the governmental/proprietary distinction is
widespread. 42 The North Dakota Supreme Court has disavowed
application of the governmental/proprietary distinction and has
adopted the principle of nonliability for discretionary acts. 43
In 1965 the North Dakota Supreme Court considered
abrogation of the immunity doctrine in Fetzer v. Minot Park
District.44 Although the plaintiff in Fetzer argued that the doctrine
was "archaic" and that many jurisdictions had abolished it, the
court was not ready to renounce the doctrine at that time. 45 The
32. Parker v. City of Highland Park, 404 Mich. 183, 195, 273 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1978). A
separate line of cases maintains that the operation of a hospital is a governmental function for which
no liability attaches. See RHYNE, supra note 29, at 1056. A further development in this area is the
principle that a municipality's liability turns on the profit or nonprofit status of the hospital or the
paying or nonpaying status of the patient. Id.
33. Johnson v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 133 Mich. App. 603, - , 350 N.W.2d 295,
297 (1984); Ex parte Houston, 93 Okla. Crim. App. 26, - , 224 P.2d 281, 292 (1950). Contra
Schultz v. City of Houston, 551 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
34. Stringfield v. Hackensack, 68 N.J. Super. 38, -. , 171 A.2d 361, 365(1961).
35. People v. Downey County Water Dist., 202 Cal. App. 2d 786, -, 21 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374
(1962).
36. Jackson v. Smith, 309 So. 2d 520, 523 (Miss. 1975); Barnett v. Cal M, Inc., 79 N.M. 553,
- 445 P.2d 974, 977 (1968).
37. Weaver v. DuffNorton Co., 115 Mich. App. 286, 320 N.W.2d 248, 251 (1982).
38. City of Sac City v. Bentsen, 329 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa 1982).
39. Friedman v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 3d 317, -, 125 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (1975);
Irvine v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 113,. -, 210 A.2d 359, 361 (1965).
40. Se RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 895C comment e (1979). For an explanation of the
governmental-proprietary distinction in Michigan, see Cooperrider, The Court, the Legislature, and
Governmental Tort Liability in Michigan, 72 MicH. L. REv. 187, 229-37 (1973).
4 1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 895C commente (1979).
42. See id.
43. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 805 (N.D. 1974). For a discussion of
governmental immunity for discretionary acts, see infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
44. 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965), overruled, Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D.
1974). For a discussion of Kitto, see infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
45. Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601, 603, 604 (N.D. 1965), overruled, Kitto v.
Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Kitto, see infra notes 56-73 and
accompanying text.
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court recognized the doctrine as judicially created, but emphasized
that it was also founded in article I, section 9 [at that time article I,
section 22] of the North Dakota Constitution, 46 which provides:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall
have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in
such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct. 47
The court determined that since the legislature had not provided
for claims similar to the one at bar, the plaintiff's claim would not
be permitted. 48
In addition, the court relied on section 40-43-07 of the North
Dakota Century Code, which rejected implied waiver of
governmental immunity, to justify the retention of immunity.4 9
Thus, pursuant to the court's decision in Fetzer, the immunity
doctrine remained in place for almost another decade.
III. NORTH DAKOTA'S ABOLITION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
The demise of governmental immunity was inevitable."
Traditionally, governmental immunity stemmed from broad policy
considerations. 51 At one time, the concept of sovereignty alone
served as a justification for immunity; however, two competing
concerns eventually overshadowed that justification. 5 Those two
concerns are the basic concept of tort law that liability follows
46. Id. at 603.
47. N.D. CONST. art I, S 9 (emphasis added).
48. 138 N.W.2d at 604.
49. Id. Section 40-43-07 of the North Dakota Century Code, as it existed prior to repeal in 1977,
provided for motor vehicle liability insurance for the state and its political subdivisions, and stated
that "It]his seciion shall not deprive any political subdivision of the state of its rights to claim
governmental immunity or immunity of employer but such immunity shall not be available to the
insurance carrier furnishing such insurance. Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance of Governmental
Bodies Act, ch. 266, 5 3, 1965 N.D. Laws 508, 509-10. The current provisions are found in chapter
32-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-12.1 (Supp. 1985).
50. See Olson, Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability -- Two Decades of Decline: 1959-1979, 31
BAYLOR L. REV. 485, 487-89 (1979) (noting that by 1955, legislative and judicial dissatisfaction with
the doctrine of governmental immunity was widespread).
51. See id. at 488. Arguments supporting the governmental immunity doctrine include the
following: Tort claims threaten funds needed for public services; some necessary governmental
services are inherently dangerous and would not be performed without the protection of immunity;
many unfounded claims would arise, and would be costly to investigate and defend; and taxpayers,
who would ultimately pay the claims, should not have to bear such costs. See id.
52. See C. RHYNE, supra note 29, S 32.2, at 1042.
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negligence, and the constitutional guarantee that every person is
entitled to a remedy for his or her injuries. 53  Courts created
numerous exceptions to the doctrine in an attempt to alleviate the
harsh results that occurred.5 4  But these exceptions merely
compounded the problems of inequity and inconsistency, and
fueled the movement to abolish or limit the doctrine. 55
In 1974 the North Dakota Supreme Court issued a landmark
decision in Kitto v. Minot Park District,56 which overruled prior
decisions that supported the established principle of governmental
immunity. 57 The plaintiff in Kitto was the mother of a twelve year
old boy who died after nearly drowning in a duck pond in a Minot
city park.5 8 According to the plaintiff, the park district removed an
existing fence around the pond and subsequently failed to properly
protect the public, children in particular, against accidents. 59
In affording relief to the plaintiff, the court examined the
doctrine of governmental immunity. 60 The court recognized the
judicial origin and modification of the doctrine. 61 Judicial support
for the doctrine had persisted for over a century. 62 Nevertheless,
the court joined the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in
concluding that the doctrine no longer served a meaningful
purpose.6 3 The court recognized that unjust consequences resulted
from the application of the immunity doctrine.6 4
A significant aspect of the Kitto decision was the court's
recognition of a distinction between state immunity and local
governmental immunity. 65  The court determined that the
53. Id.; see e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 (guaranteeing a remedy at law for any injury). For the
language of article 1, S 9 of the North Dakota Constitution, see supratext accomanying note 47.
54. Olson, supra note 50, at 487. As exceptions to governmental immunity, North Dakota courts
have endorsed liability for taking private property without compensation, and liability for torts
committed during the exercise of a proprietary function. For a discussion of these exceptions, see
supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
55. See generally Olson, supra note 50, at 487-500 (discussing legislative and judicial limitations on
municipal tort immunity); comment, supra note 2 (same).
56. 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974).
57. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 797 (N.D. 1974).
58. Id. at 796-97.
59. Id. at 797.
60. Id. at 798-99.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 797-98.
64. Id. The court noted the injustice done when one plaintiff must bear the burden of a wrong by
the government, when the cost would be more easily borne by the community as a whole. Id. at 798.
65. Id. at 800-01. Local governmental units are treated differently than state entities in many
respects. See N.D. CONST. art. VII, S I (municipal corporations established as separate entities); id.
art. X, §§ 15-17 (debts of various subdivisions treated differently than those of the state); id. art. X, S
13 (restrictions placed on state incurred debts); id art. IV, S 43 (legislative assembly may not enact
local or special laws in certain areas); id. art. XII, S10 (consent of local authority must be obtained
before constructing and operating a street, railroad, telegraph, telephone or electric light plant
within any city, town or incorporated village).
19861 387
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constitutional basis previously asserted in support of immunity
related only to sovereign (state) immunity, and not to local
governmental immunity. 66
The court also examined the argument that abrogation of the
doctrine would invade the province of the legislature. 67 The court
noted that the legislature had enacted numerous statutes
authorizing tort actions against certain governmental units. 68 It
interpreted these statutes to indicate the legislature's support of
abrogation. 69 Therefore, after analyzing the historical development
of the doctrine, and considering the constitutional and statutory
bases asserted in its favor, the court concluded that there was no
support for the continued existence of the doctrine as it applied to
local governmental entities.70
The court in Kitto held that local governmental entities are
subject to suit for damages to individuals caused by the negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions of their agents and employees. 71 One
specific exception to liability exists, however, for torts committed in
the execution of a discretionary function. 72 As the court in Kitto
said: "[t]he exercise of discretion carries with it the right to be
wrong. ' '
This exception to liability for discretionary functions is a
widely accepted principle.7 4 It is frequently implemented through a
66. 224 N.W.2d at 800. The court stated that article 1, 5 22 [now article 1, 5 91 of the North
Dakota Constitution mandated state immunity. Id. For the language of article 1, 5 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution, see supra text accompanying note 47. The court concluded, however, that since
the provision referred to suits against "the state," the immunity did not extend to political
subdivisions. See id. at 801.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 802. Suits are authorized against park districts (see N.D. CENT. CODE S 40-49-04
(1983)); counties (see id. 5 11-10-01 (1985)); municipalities (see id. S 40-01-02 (1983)); school districts
(ser id. 5 15-47-43 (1981)): and townships (sre id. S 58-03-07(3) (1983)).
69. 224 N.W.2d at 8U2.
70. Id. at 803. Judicial abrogation of local governmental immunity is widespread.
Governmental immunity from tort liability has been abrogated, either totally or partially, in all states
except the following: Arkansas (see ARK. STAT. ANN. 55 12-2901 (1979 & Supp. 1985)) and Georgia
(see Sheley v. Board of Public Educ., 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975); GA. CONST. art. 1, 5 11, 1
IX). It is well settled in North Dakota that the state is immune from suit unless authorized by the
legislature. See Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67, 74 (N.D. 1983); Senger v. Hulstrand
Constr., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507, 508 (N.D. 1982).
71. 224 N.W.2d at 797. The removal of local governmental immunity does not subject an entity
to absolute liability in place of immunity. Johnson v. Municipal Univ., 184 Neb. 512, -, 169
N.W.2d 286, 288 (1969). The issue of immunity and the issue of liability are separate. Id.
See generally Annotation, Effect of Statute Permitting State to be Sued upon the Question of its Liabiliy for
Negligence or Tort, 13 A.L.R. 1276 (1921).
72. See 224 N.W.2d at 804 (retaining governmental immunity for discretionary decisions). The
court stated as follows: "We do not contemplate that the essential acts of governmental decision-
making be the subject of judicial second-guessing or harassment by the actual or potential threat of
litigation." Id.
73. Id.
74. PROSSER. sut.ra note 8. at 1052.
388
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statute. At the federal level, the discretionary function exception to
liability is found in the Federal Tort Claims Act.7 5 In North
Dakota, the exception is located in subsection 3 of section 32-12.1-
03 of-the North Dakota Century Code. 7 6
The leading federal case interpreting the discretionary
function exception is Dalehite v. United States. 77 In Dalehite the United
States Supreme Court applied a test that is now referred to as the
"planning-operational" rationale for 'assessing liability.78 Under
this rationale, the government's conduct is protected if it is
exercised at the planning level. 79 However, once a decision is
executed at the operational level, it is not immune and must be
carried out with reasonable care.80
The planning-operational distinction is difficult to apply.8'
Therefore, the test is frequently utilized in combination with other
approaches.8 2 For example, another test used in discerning whether
the function at issue is discretionary is an examination of the nature
and quality of the discretion.83 In accordance with this trend, the
North Dakota Supreme Court employs the planning-operational
75. 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a) (1982). Section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act provides as
follows:
The provisions lallowing claims against the United Statesi shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the executioin of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
76. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-03(3)(Supp. 1985). Subsection 3 of 5 32-12.1-03, which applies
to political subdivisions of the state, contains substantially the same language as S 2680 (a) of the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Compare 28 U.S.C. S 2680 (a) (1982) (quoted, supra note 75) with N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 32-12.1-03(3)(Supp. 1985). In addition, the North Dakota provision provides that:
Specifically, a political subdivision or an employee thereof shall not be liable for any claim
which results from:
c. The decision to perform or the refusal to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty, whether or not such discretion be abused and whether or not the statute, charter,
ordinance, order, resolution, regulation, or resolve under which the discretionary
function or duty, is performed is valid or invalid.
Id. S 32-12.1-03(3)(c) (Supp. 1985).
77. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite the adoption of a fertilizer export program, and the control of
manufacturing, packaging, labeling; and shipping were held to be discretionary functions. Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 38-39 (1953).
78. See id. at 36; PROSSER, supra note 8, S 131, at 1040.
79. PROSSER, supra note 8, S 131, at 1040.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1041.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Robertson v. City of Topeka, 644 P.2d 458 (Kan. 1982) (police officers' decision
not to arrest an individual held to be a discretionary function). Under the nature and quality test, the
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test as only one factor to consider.8 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court has addressed the
discretionary function exception on three occasions.8 5 In Sande v.
City of Grand Forks86 the court affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the city on the basis that the actions of an urban renewal
agency were discretionary. 87 In McCroskey v. Cass County 88 the court
concluded that the final decision made by Cass County and its
employees concerning whether to detain a person who had been
determined to be intoxicated was a discretionary function. 89
Finally, in McLain v. Midway Township 90 the court held that the
township's refusal to approve the plaintiffs' request to remove their
house into the township was a discretionary function and therefore
could not be used as a basis for holding the township liable. 91
The three cases mentioned above clearly indicate that North
Dakota adheres to the discretionary function exception to liability.
However, it is difficult to determine how much protection is
actually afforded to local governmental entities under this
exception. Courts customarily provide immunity for two specific
discretionary functions: the issuance or revocation of a license, and
the design of highways. 92 These two functions are the only areas in
which application of the discretionary exception appears to be
predictable. 93 Other areas are not as clear, and each case is
evaluated on its individual facts and circumstances. 94
court considers whether the act in question is of a type intended by the legislature to be immune from
liability. Id. at 461. This test enlarges immunity beyond those decisions made at the planning level.
Note, Governmental Liability: A Review of Judicial Decisions Applying the Kansas Tort Claims Act, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 499, 511-12 (1985).
84. See Sande v. City of Grand Forks, 269 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1978). The plaintiffs in Sande
alleged that the Urban Renewal Agency of Grand Forks provided them with erroneous information
based on outdated regulations. Id. at 94. In determining whether a discretionary function was
involved when the agency dispensed information to the public, the court relied primarily on the
language of the agency regulations. Id. at 97-98. Because the authority of the agency was stated in
very broad terms, the court concluded that discretion was necessary in the performance of most of
the agency's operations, including the dispensation of information. Id. The court specifically rejected
the planning-operational distinction as controlling on the determination of a discretionary function.
Id. at 98.
85. See McLain v. Midway Township, 326 N.W.2d 196 (N.D. 1982); McCroskey v. Cass
County, 303 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1981); Sande v. City of Grand Forks, 269 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1978).
86. 269 NW.2d 93 (N.D. 1978).
87. Sande v. City ofGrand Forks, 269 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1978).
88. 303 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1981).
89. McCroskey v. Cass County, 303 N.W.2d 330, 335 (N.D. 1981). The court determined that
the legal process of confining a person for detoxification involved both discretionary (determining
intoxication) and nondiscretionary (notifying family) functions. Id.
90. 326 N.W.2d 196(N.D. 1982).
91. McLain v. Midway Township, 326 N.W.2d 196, 199(N.D. 1982).
92. C. RHYNE, supra note 29, S 32.11, 32.20.
93. See id. §S 32.8, 32.10, 32.13, 32.19 (courts reach various results when addressing the
discretionary exception in specific areas other than licenses and highways).
94. See id.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO KITTO, AND
SUBSEQUENT CASELAW
Subsequent to the decision in Kitto v. Minot Park District,95
political subdivisions found that their liability exposure increased
considerably. An immediate legislative response to Kitto was the
enactment of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, which
provided that political subdivisions are liable for injuries caused by
the negligence or wrongful act or omission of its officers,
employees, or servants. 96 The legislature did not authorize
recovery for punitive damages. 97 The Act limited the amount of
recovery to $20,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. 98 The
Act was an emergency measure designed to serve from passage
throughJune 30, 1977. 99
An interim study committee enacted permanent provisions in
1977.100 According to subsection 32-12.1-03(1) of the North Dakota
Century Code, recovery is available against a political subdivision
when the claimed injuries "are proximately caused by the
negligence or wrongful act or omission of any employee acting
within the scope of the employee's employment or office under
circumstances where the employee would be personally liable." 101
The amount of recovery is presently limited to $250,000 per person
and $500,000 per occurrence; however, punitive damages may
exceed these limits if the injuries are caused by willful or malicious
conduct. 10 2 A political subdivision is not liable for an employee's
acts or omissions in the execution of a statute or regulation, 10 3 nor
is a political subdivision liable for an act described as a
"discretionary function." '1 0 4  An action for damages may be
brought against an employee personally if the injuries are
proximately caused by the negligence, wrongful act, or omission of
the employee acting outside the scope of employment.105
95. 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). For a discussion of Kitlo, see supra notes 56-73 and
accompanying text.
96. Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, ch. 295, 1975 N.D. Laws 861, 862 S 2(1) (current
version at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32- 12.1-03(1), (2) (Supp. 1985).
97. Id. 5 2 (2).
98. Id.
99. Id. 515.
100. Political Subdivision Liability Act, ch. 303, 1977 N.D. Laws 685. Current provisions are
found in SS 32-12.1-01 to -15 of the North Dakota Century Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE SS 32- 12.1-
01 to -15 (Supp. 1985).
101. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-03(1) (Supp. 1985).
102. Id. S 32-12.1-03(2).
103. Id. S 32-12.1-03(3).
104. Id. For a discussion of the discretionary function exception to liability, see supra notes 72-94
and accompanying text.
105. Id. 1 32-12.1-04.
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Employees and political subdivisions may be jointly or severally
liable for punitive damages. 06 The current statutory provisions
allow for indemnification of an employee for any claim and final
judgment based on an act occurring within the scope of
employment. 07
The present dollar limits on liability contained in section 32-
12.1-03 of the North Dakota Century Code have not been
challenged in the North Dakota Supreme Court. However,
challenges against similar provisions in other states have not been
successful.' 08 For example, in Crowe v. John W. Harton Memorial
HospitalW 0 9 the Tennessee Court of Appeals employed a minimal
level of scrutiny in upholding a tort liability act against an equal
protection challenge." 0 The court noted that the state had a valid
interest in protecting its tax revenues against depletion by tort
claims. I I
Thus the Kitto decision, subsequent legislative action, and
recent case law establish the following guidelines for governmental
106. Id.
107. Id. 5 32-12.1-04(4).
108. See, e.g., Cargill's Estate v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1979) ($50,000
limitation upheld), appeal denied, 445 U.S. 921 (1979); State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, -, 478 P.2d
591, 594 (1971) ($25,000 limitation upheld); cf. Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 66 Wis. 2d 296, -. ,
224 N.W.2d 582, 591-92 (1975) (challenge to $25,000 limit not addressed on appeal because it was
not raised in trial court).
109. 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). The plaintiff in Crowe sued a city -owned hospital
for medical malpractice. Crowe v. John W. Harton Memorial Hospital, 577 S.W.2d 888,
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). The hospital admitted liability, but asserted that the plaintiff's recovery was
limited by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Id.
I 10. Id. at 892-93 ($20,000 limitation upheld).
I 11. Id. at 893. The following states have enacted statutory limitations on the recovery of
damages from political subdivisions: Alabama (see ALA. CODE S 11-93-2 (1985) ($100,000 per person,
$300,000 per occurrence)); Colorado (see CoLo. REV. STAT. S 24-10-114 (1982) ($150,000 per
person, $400,000 per occurrence)); Delaware (see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 5 4013 (Supp. 1984)
($300,000 per occurrence)); Florida (see FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 768.28(5) (1986) (5100,000 per person,
$200,000 per occurrence)); Indiana (see IND. CODE ANN. 5 34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986) (5300,000 per
person, $5,000,000 per occurrence)); Kansas (see KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 75-6105 (1984) ($500,000 per
occurrence)); Maine (see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, S 8105 (1980) ($300,000 per occurrence));
Massachusetts (see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, 5 2 (West Supp. 1986) ($100,000 per
occurrence)); Minnesota (see MINN. STAT. ANN. S 466.04 (1984) ($200,000 per person, $600,000 per
occurrence, twice these limits in cases in which recovery is based on release of hazardous substance));
Montana (see MONT. CODE ANN. 5 2-9-107 (1985) (terminates June 30, 1987) ($300,000 per claim,
$1,000,000 per occurrence)); Nevada (see NEv. REV. STAT. S 41.035 (1985) ($50,000)); New
Hampshire (see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 507-B:4 (1983) ($100,000 per person)); New Mexico (see
N.M. STAT. ANN. S 41-4-19 (1986) ($300,000 per person, $500,000 per occurrence)); North Dakota
(See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-12.1-03(2) (Supp. 1985) ($250,000 per person, $500,000 per
occurrence)); Oklahoma (see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154, (Supp. 1985) ($25,000 property loss,
$100,000 for other loss, $1,000,000 per occurrence)); Oregon (see OR. REV. STAT. S 30.270 (1985)
($50,000 property loss, $100,000 all other claims, $300,000 per occurrence)); Pennsylvania (see PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 5 8553 (Purdon 1982) ($500,000 aggregate)); Rhode Island (see R.I. GEN. LAWS 5
9-31-3 (1985) ($100,000)); South Carolina (see S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-70 (Law. Co-op. 1977)
($15,000 bodily injury, $5000 property damage)); Texas (see TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE, tit. 5,
5 101.023b (Vernon 1986) ($100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence for bodily injury or death,
$100,000 per occurrence for loss of property)); Wyoming (see Wyo. STAT. 5 1-39-118 (Supp.
1985) ($500,000 for all claims arising out of single occurrence)).
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liability in North Dakota. State sovereign immunity remains
intact. 112 All other governmental entities are, however, liable for
damages up to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per occurrence
for torts committed by the negligence or wrongful acts or omissions
of their employees within the scope of employment. 113 Torts
committed in the exercise of a discretionary function are exempt
from liability. 114
V. THE ABROGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE LIABILITY
EXPOSURE OF POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
The predictable result of the decline in the application of the
governmental immunity doctrine in North Dakota and across the
country was an increase-in litigation against political subdivisions.
Suits against political subdivisions in North Dakota arise out of
allegations ranging from faulty road design to accidents involving
use of public recreational facilities.
Outside of North Dakota, the political subdivision liability
problem is even more serious due to the application of joint and
several liability. 115 In" pure" comparative negligence jurisdictions,
political subdivisions that are found liable for a small portion of
negligence, even less than the degree of negligence attributable to
the plaintiff, must pay the entire judgment whenever the principal
tortfeasor is financially incapable of paying the judgment.116 Under
these circumstances, plaintiffs frequently tie political subdivisions
into lawsuits because of their desire to recover from a solvent
defendant, or a "deep pocket." 17
This application of joint and several liability to political
subdivisions is one of the most glaring inequities in comparative
112. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-12.1-03(4) (Supp. 1985) (sovereign immunity of the state is not
waived by chapter providing for liability of political subdivisions); Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224
N.W.2d 795, 803 (N.D. 1974) (stating that sovereign immunity of the state remains unaffected by
the Kitto decision abolishing municipal immunity).
113. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-03(l) (Supp. 1985) (liability for torts of employee); id. S 32-
12. 1 -03(20) (limitations on rccovery).
114. Id. S 32-12.1-03(3). For a discussion of immunity for discretionary functions, see supra
notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
115. See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 61, 62. Under
the doctrine ofjoint and several liability, a plaintiff injured by the joint actions of several defendants
may collect the entire judgment from a single defendant. Id. at 61.
116. See PROSSER, supra note 8, at 472. In jurisdictions that have adopted the pure comparative
negligence doctrine, a plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to his or her own degree of fault.
Id.
117. SeeGranelli, supra note 115, at 61.
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negligence jurisdictions."" The inequity is not a serious problem in
this state, however, for two reasons. First, pure comparative
negligence is not the rule in North Dakota. 19 North Dakota has a
modified comparative negligence law. 120 In North Dakota a
plaintiff can only recover from a defendant whose negligence is
greater than . the plaintiff's.' 12  In cases involving multiple
defendants, the plaintiff recovers only from those defendants whose
negligence is greater than the plaintiff's. 22 Second, North Dakota
places limitations on the amount of damages that can be assessed
against political subdivisions. 2 3 Therefore, the liability exposure of
our cities, counties, and other local governmental units is
significantly limited. 124
To assist political subdivisions in limiting their exposure, the
North Dakota Legislature passed legislation that allows political
subdivisions to purchase insurance. 125  However, political
subdivisions feel the impact of the current insurance market, which
118. Id. at 62. The principle of joint and several liability is under attack in several of the pure
comparative jurisdictions. Id.
119. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975). Section 9-10-07 provides as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering .... When there are two or more persons
who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of
negligence attributable to each; provided, however, that each shall remain jointly and
severally liable for the whole award.
Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. S 32-12.1-03(2) (Supp. 1985) liability limited to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per
occurrence, exclusive of punitive damages).
124. Id.
125. Id. S 23-12.1-05 (authorizing the purchase of insurance); id. S 32-12.1-07 (specifying who
may provide insurance); id. § 32-12.1-08 (allowingan insurance reserve fund). Most states authorize
or mandate the purchase of insurance by political subdivisions:
LIABILITY INSURANCE
Coverage Coverage
State Authorized Mandated Section
1. Arizona X ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§5 9-497, 11-261 (1977)
2. Arkansas X ARK. STAT. ANN.
On motor 5 12-2903 (1979)
vehicles
3. Colorado X COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 24-10-104, 24-10-115,
24-14-102 (Supp. 1982)
4. Florida X FLA. STAT. ANN.
S 768.28(13) (1986)
5. Georgia X GA. CODE ANN.
S 56-2437 (Supp. 1986)
19861
6. Idaho
7. Illinois
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8. Iowa
9. Kansas
10. Maine
11. Massachusetts
12. Michigan
13. Mississippi
14. Missouri
15. Nebraska
16. Nevada
17. New Hampshire
18. New Mexico
19. North Carolina
20. North Dakota
21. Pennsylvania
22. Tennessee
23. Texas
24. Utah
25. Vermont
26. Virginia
27. West Virginia
28. Wyoming
X
XIn general XPolice and
fire vehicles
IDAHO.CODE SS 6-923
(1979), 6-924 (Supp. 1986)
ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 85, 9-103
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986)
IOWA CODE ANN.
S 613A.7 (West Supp. 1986)
KAN. STAT. ANN.
S 75-6111 (1984)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, S8116
(Supp. 1985)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 258, S 8 (West 1986)
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
S 691. 1409 (1968 &
Supp. 1986)
MIss. CODE ANN.
S 19-7-8 (Supp. 1985)
(to be repealed effective
Nov. 1, 1986)
Mo. REV. STAT.
S 537.610(l) (Supp. 1986)
NEB. REV. STAT.
S 23-2413 (1983)
NEV. REV. STAT.
S 41.038 (1985)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
S 412.3 (1983)
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-4-20, 23, 25, 28 (1986)
N.C. GEN. STAT.
S§ 160A-485 (1982),
153A-435 (1983)
N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 32-12.1-05, 07, 08,
15 (Supp. 1985)
PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 42, S 8564
(Purdon 1974)
TENN. CODE ANN.
S 29-20-403 (Supp. 1986)
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 999d, 999d-1,
999e (Vernon Supp. 1986);
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. S 101.027
(Vernon 1986)
UTAH CODE ANN.
S 63-30-28 (Supp. 1985)
VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, S 1092 (Supp.
1986); id. tit. 29,
SS1403, 1404(1970
& Supp. 1985)
VA. CODE SS 15.1-19.1,
15.1-506.1, 15.1-
506.2 (1981)
W. VA. CODE
S 8-12-7 (1984)
WYO. STAT.
S 1-39-118 (Supp. 1986)
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is typified by high premiums and tight availability.126
An example of the availability problem in North Dakota
occurred at the onset of the current market in early 1985. On
January 3, 1985, fourteen cities and nine counties notified the
North Dakota Insurance Department that they were losing their
liability insurance coverage on January 11, and that they had no
prospects of obtaining coverage from any other source by this date.
Negotiations between the Insurance Department and the existing
carrier resulted in a temporary extension of coverage. This
temporary extension gave the affected cities and counties the
opportunity to secure other coverage. Prior to receiving the
extension of coverage, some counties planned to park their sheriff's
department vehicles and snow removal equipment until other
coverage could be obtained.
In the fall of 1985 the North Dakota Legislative Council
surveyed the state's political subdivisions regarding the cost of
obtaining liability coverage. 127 The survey results clearly indicate
that the cost of obtaining coverage has increased dramatically in
recent years. 128 These price increases significantly impair the
ability of a political subdivision to meet its financial obligations.
Political pressure for tort reform is a natural consequence of the
problems caused by the limited availability and the increased cost
of insurance.
Legislative action to further limit the liability exposure of
political subdivisions is imminent. During the last legislative
session, the impact of the current insurance market was not fully
realized by all of the state's political subdivisions. The current
126. Vitullo & Peters, Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Municipal Insurance Crisis, 30 DEPAUL L.
REv. 325, 335-36(1981).
127. Summary of Response to Questionnaire on Political Subdivisions Liability Insurance Costs, Claims and
Awards, prepared by the Legislative Council staff for thejudiciary Committee, Oct. 1985.
128.
LIABILITY INSURANCE PREMIUMS
Percentage
Political Increase
Subdivision 1983 1984 1985 1983-1985
1) Adams County $ 4,812 $ 7,672 $ 27,579 473%
2) Cass County 21,718 47,526 99,912 360
3) Golden Valley County 4,378 7,137 26,505 505
4) Stutsman County 22,109 27,159 133,617 504
5) Edmore 545 2,148 2,582 374
6) Fargo 44,457 45,024 327,000 636
7) Harwood 368 491 1,673 355
8) Rolla 4,702 4,941 25,066 433
9) Grafton School
District 6,094 5,290 13,509 122
10) Walhalla School
District 1,421 1,221 3,490 146
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insurance marketplace shows no significant improvement. Thus,
the next legislative session will be under strong pressure to address
this issue through tort reform.
A central aspect of the focus on tort reform in the area of
political subdivision liability is the recognition that local
governments have unique responsibilities that compel lawmakers to
distinguish between their tort exposure and the tort exposure of a
private citizen or corporation.1 29 In Thomas v. Department of State
Highways130 the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the public
policy reasons weighing in support of some form of the
governmental immunity doctrine. 31 The court noted that, because
of the functions they perform, "public entities are fundamentally
different from private persons." ' 132 Unlike private persons,
governmental units are unable to limit their liability by refusing to
engage in certain tasks.133 Moreover, the court noted, subjecting
the decisions of the legislative and executive branches of
government to tort actions is inconsistent with the principle of
separation of powers.13 4 For these reasons, tort reform will continue
to receive support from those in a position to shape future laws.
VI. SUGGESTED AREAS OF TORT REFORM
The preceding analysis of the present liability exposure of
political subdivisions leads to the conclusion that tort reform may
be appropriate in three specific areas. As they relate to the issue of
political subdivision liability, the following changes deserve
consideration:
A. Eliminating punitive damages.
B. Shortening the statute of limitations and instituting a
notice requirement.
C. Expanding the current statutory allowance for
periodic payments ofjudgments.
The rationale for these changes considers the applicability of basic
tort principles to a political subdivision and the ability of a political
-129. See Thomas v. Department of State Highways, 398 Mich. 1, 7-8, 247 N.W.2d 530, 544
(1976) (Levine, J., dissenting).
130. 398 Mich. 1,247 N.W.2d 530 (1976).
131. Thomas v. Department of State Highways, 398 Mich. 1, 7-8, 247 N.W.2d 530, 544 (1976)
(Levine, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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subdivision to defend itself and pay claims without undue budget
disruption.
A. ELIMINATING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
North Dakota authorizes the assessment of punitive damages
against political subdivisions. 135 Punitive damages are not subject
to the general limitations on the amount of damages a plaintiff may
recover against a political subdivision. 136 According to subsection
32-12.1-03(2) of the North Dakota Century Code, "[1]iability for
punitive or exemplary damages may exceed [the statutory
limitations] when such injuries have been caused by willful or
malicious behavior or conduct." 137
The North Dakota Supreme Court discussed the rationale for
awarding punitive damages in Dahlen v. Landis. 138 In Dahlen the
court stated as follows: "The reason for awarding punitive
damages is to punish the wrongdoer in order to deter him, and
others, from repetition of the wrongful conduct. . . . the
defendant's wealth may properly be considered by the jury in fixing
punitive damages. ' 139 In scrutinizing whether this rationale
applies to political subdivisions, three issues arise: who is
punished, who is deterred, and is the taxing authority of a political
subdivision appropriate evidence of wealth?
Punishment through a punitive damage award assessed
against a local unit of government falls upon the taxpayers of that
jurisdiction. These taxpayers play no active role in the actions of
their political subdivisions that can be considered "willful or
malicious behavior" for purposes of justifying an award of punitive
damages. The punishment of blameless taxpayers, through the
awarding of punitive damages, does not make sense, and is not
sound public policy.
Deterrence also falls short as a justification for punitive awards
against political subdivisions. Since it is difficult to conceive of
circumstances in which the entire citizenry of a political subdivision
manifests willful or malicious behavior, any argument for
135. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-03(2) (Supp. 1985). Most jurisdictions disallow the award of
punitive damages against political subdivisions unless specifically authorized by statute. See generally
Annotation, Recovery of Exemplary or Punitive Damages from Municipal Corporation, I A.L.R. 4th 448
(1980).
136. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-03(2) (Supp. 1985).
137. Id.
138. 314 N.W.2d 63, 68 (N.D. 1981). The court in Dahlen upheld an award of punitive damages
for the victim ofan assault and battery. Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 69 (N.D. 1981).
139. Id. at 68.
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deterrence must rely upon deterring public officials. As discussed in
the preceding paragraph, however, an award against the political
subdivision as a whole does not fall specifically on the shoulders of
the offending officials; hence, the award has no deterrent value.
A final example of the inapplicability of punitive damages to
political subdivisions involves the means by which a punitive award
is reached. In order to fulfill the deterrent and punitive purposes of
punitive damage awards, the courts have sometimes followed the
theory that "the wealthier the wrongdoer, the greater the
award. ' 1 40 In other words, a relatively small sum might be
adequate to punish and deter a poor person; however, a much
greater sum, for the same wrong, is needed to deter a rich
person.14 1 If plaintiffs were allowed to use this theory against
municipalities, they could introduce evidence of the municipality's
unlimited taxing power as a measure of a proper verdict. 142 Such
evidence would substantially increase the possibility of excessive
damage awards. In light of the considerations discussed above,
prohibiting punitive damage awards against North Dakota's
political subdivisions is sound public policy. 143
B. SHORTENING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND INSTITUTING
A NOTICE REQUIREMENT
Section 32-12.1-10 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides a three year limitation for pursuing a tort claim against a
political subdivision. 144 North Dakota does not require a plaintiff to
present notice of a claim to a political subdivision within a specific
time period.
A statute of limitations affects the time in which an individual
can pursue a legal right. 145 It does not affect the right itself. 146 The
rationale for setting forth a statute of limitations on tort claims
against political subdivisions is one of convenience and necessity.
The purpose behind a statute of limitations is to compel a plaintiff
to pursue the cause of action within a reasonable time so that the
defendant has a fair opportunity to defend. 14 7 It is virtually
140. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the legitimacy of a legislative prohibition on
punitive damages against political subdivisions. See Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297 N.W.2d
152, 156 n.5 (Minn. 1980).
144. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-10 (Supp. 1985).
145. In re Smith's Estate, 240 Iowa 499, 517, 36 N.W.2d 815,825 (1949).
146. Id.
147. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, reh'gdenied, 325 U.S. 896(1945).
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impossible for a political subdivision to defend a claim when
evidence dissipates, witnesses disappear or die, and memories
fade. 14 8 Thus, statutes of limitations eliminate undue delay in
pursuing a legal right and prevent the assertion of fraudulent and
stale claims. 149
The broad public policy underlying this concept is the
promotion of peace and welfare within society, the prevention of
fraud, and the encouragement of prompt claim settlement. 150 The
three year statute of limitations instituted by the North Dakota
Legislature in 1977 is a generous one. 151 Numerous other states
have shorter limitation periods. 152 Shortening the statute of
limitations is a suggestion that North Dakota's Legislature may
find suitable; and it is the legislature that is the appropriate body to
determine the time allowed for a suit. 153
The obvious obstacle in amending North Dakota's statute of
limitations is the possibility of constitutional attack. Generally, a
limitation statute survives constitutional attack if it is not
unreasonable.' 54 It is unreasonable if it does not fully afford the
litigant an opportunity to sue before the time limit expires. 155 The
North Dakota Supreme Court applied this principle in Osborne v.
Lindstrom. 156
In Osborne the plaintiff brought an action in 1897 upon a
judgment rendered in 1883.15 The statute of limitations in effect at
the time the judgment was rendered provided twenty years within
which to pursue relief. 158 Two years prior to the plaintiff's action in
Osborne, however, the legislature reduced the limitation period to
ten years. 159 The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
concluding that the new provision complied with the "universally
recognized rule that [statutes of limitations] cannot be used to cut
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Baron v. Kurn, 349 Mo. 1202, 1214, 164 S.W.2d 310,317 (1942).
151, See N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-10 (Supp. 1985) (statute of limitations for tort actions
against political subdivisions).
152. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. S 613A.5 (West 1986) (statute of limitations is six months, unless
notice is given to municipality within sixty days; in that case action must be commenced within two
years of the notice); MINN. STAT. S 466.05(1) (1984) (notice must be presented within 180 days and
the action must be commenced within one year of the notice); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. S 9-24-5
(1981) (statute of limitations for actions against a municipality is two years from occurrence of the
accident).
153. Adams & Freese Co. v. Kenoyer, 17 N.D. 302, 306, 116 N.W. 98, 99 (1908).
154. See Baron, 349 Mo. at 1214, 164 S.W.2d at 317 (noting that the courts favor limitation
statutes).
155.Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N.D. 1, 8-9, 81 N.W. 72, 74-75 (1899).
156.9 N.D. 1, 81 N.W. 72 (1899).
157. Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N.D. 1,3,81 N.W. 72, 72 (1899).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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off causes of action without leaving a reasonable time within which
to assert them.' 60 The court emphasized the fact that ten months
elapsed between passage of the act and its effective date, thus giving
the plaintiff adequate opportunity to bring a claim. 161
The legislature might consider a limitation period of two
years. A two year limitation fulfills the public policy goals in
support of statutes of limitations. Moreover, a two year limitation
period appears reasonable in light of relevant caselaw addressing
constitutional attacks on similar provisions. 162
The rationale behind notice requirements is basically the same
as that which supports statutes of limitations.163  Notice
requirements generally prescribe short periods of time in which
plaintiffs must present notification of their claims to political
subdivisions. 164  A notice of claim requirement as a condition
precedent to the bringing of a suit is valid in the majority of
jurisdictions. 165 Due process and equal protection challenges to
notice requirements have been generally unsuccessful. 166
A ninety day notice provision withstood a constitutional
challenge in Herman v. Magnuson. 16 7 In Magnuson the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the provisions requiring ninety days
notice for claims against municipalities did not violate the equal
protection clause. 168 In upholding the ninety day provision, the
court employed the intermediate level of scrutiny to examine the
160. Id. at6, 12, 81 N.W. at 73, 76.
161. Id. at 12, 81 N.W. at 76.
162. See, e.g., Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392, 397-98 (Iowa 1983) (statute
requiring that action be brought within six months, or within two years if notice given, does not
violate equal protection clause); cf. Chavez v. Sprague, 209 Cal. App. 2d 101, -, 25 Cal. Rptr.
603, 606 (1962) (upholding 90 day notice of claim statute).
163. See generally Annotation, Modern Status of the Law as to Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring
Notice of Tort Claim Against Local Governmental Entity, 59 A.L.R.3d 93, 97 (1974). For a brief discussion
of the purposes of statutes of limitations, see supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
164. See, e.g., IowA CoDE ANN. §613A.5 (West 1986) (60 days); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. S 8107(1)
(1980) (180 days); MINN. STAT. S 466.05(1) (1984) (180 days); OR. REV. STAT. 5 30.275(2) (1985)
(one year for wrongful death, 180 days for all other claims).
165. See, e.g., Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 9 111. App. 3d 897, 902, 293 N.E.2d 440, 443
(1973) (notice of claim statute does not violate equal protection clause, due process clause, or state
constitution); Brown v. Portland School Dist. Number 1, 48 Or. App. 571, __, 617 P.2d 665, 668
(1980) (notice requirement, which enables public bodies to promptly investigate and adjust claims,
and aids them in obtaining liability insurance, does not violate the equal protection clause). See
generally Annotation, supra note 163 at 102-26 (extensive discussion of cases).
166. See, e.g., Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468, -, 426 P.2d 753, 761, 58
Cal. Rptr. 249, 257, (1967) (notice requirement does not violate due process or equal protection
guarantees); Housewright v. City of LaHarpe, 51 Iii. 2d 357, 361, 282 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1972)
(same); Respaskey, 9 111. App. 3d at 901, 293 N.E.2d at 443 (same); Brown, 48 Or. App. at -, 617
P.2d at 668 (notice requirement does not violate equal protection clause).
167. 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1979).
168. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 454 (N.D. 1979); see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
5 1 (equal protection clause); see also N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 22 ("All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation").
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correspondence between the statutory classification and legislative
goals. 16 9 The court stated that the purpose of the ninety day written
notice requirement was to facilitate the following: (1) prompt
investigation while the evidence is fresh; (2) repair of any
dangerous condition; (3) quick and amicable settlement of
meritorious claims; and (4) fiscal preparation for any possible
liability. 170 The court concluded that the statute furthered these
goals sufficiently to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 71 The ninety
day notice provision was repealed in 1977, not because of
constitutional defectiveness, but because of the implementation of
chapter 32-12.1, which does not include a notice provision. 172
Notice provisions typically vary from sixty days to six
months. 173 A notice provision of six months would likely withstand
a constitutional challenge in North Dakota. 174
C. EXPANDING THE CURRENT STATUTORY ALLOWANCE FOR
PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Damages awarded to a plaintiff for compensation of future
economic and noneconomic losses can significantly increase the
amount of an original tort judgment. Legislation that authorizes a
trial judge to allow political subdivisions to pay the portion of the
award allocated to future damages on an installment basis would
reduce the budget disruption imposed by a tort judgment.
Courts have consistently held, however, that judgments must
be paid in one lump sum absent explicit statutory authorization for
periodic payments. 7 5 In Frankel v. United States176 a federal district
169. 277 N.W.2d at 451. In determining that'the intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate,
the court relied onJohnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974). In Johnson the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the guest statute, prohibiting recovery for damages negligently caused to a
person who accepts a ride without paying for it, violated the North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 780.
Although the court in Johnson did not specify which level of scrutiny was utilized, a review of its
analysis discloses that the court applied an intermediate standard. Herman, 277 N.W.2d at 451. The
court in Herman stated that the case at bar was analogous to Johnson, since both involved a statutory
limitation on the right to sue a tortfeasor. Id. Thus, the intermediate standard was applied in the
Herman case. Id.
170. 277 N.W.2d at 453-54 (citing Fritz v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 196 Colo. 335,
338, 586 P.2d 23, 25 (1978)).
171. See id., 277 N.W.2d at 454.
172. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-12.1 (Supp. 1985) (liability of political subdivisions).
173. For citations to typical notice statutes, see supra note 164.
174. Many courts have upheld notice limits of six months or less. See, e.g., Budahl v. Gordon &
David Assocs., 287 N.W.2d 489 (S.D. 1980) (60 days); Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646
(Utah 1976) (90 days). See generally Annotation, supra note 163, at 102-26 (extensive discussion of
cases involving notice of claim statutes).
175. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Simons, 190 Ark. 496, 79 S.W.2d 419 (1935). The
common-law principle, which is. inconsistent with the periodic payments concept, is that the
amount of money judgments must be certain. See United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co.,
356 U.S. 227, 233-34 (1958).
176. 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d
Cir. 1972).
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court expressed the desirability of periodic payments as a means of
providing "justice through just compe'nsation, no more - no
less." 77 But the court refrained from awarding anything other than
a lump sum judgment absent specific statutory authorization.' 78
The court's reluctance in Frankel indicates that the legislature must
take the initiative to provide the mechanism for periodic.
payments. 7 9
From a conceptual standpoint, it appears equitable to require
payment for future damages as they accrue rather than as a lump
sum payment in an amount representing a discounted present
value for those damages. 18 0 Jury calculations of future damages
have the potential of inadequately compensating a plaintiff who
lives longer than projected, or of producing an undeserved windfall
to the plaintiff's estate if he dies of an unrelated cause sooner than
expected. 181
There are several reasons why a judgment creditor may find
periodic payment of damages preferable to the traditional lump
sum payment. In cases in which the judgment creditor does not
have sophisticated money management skills, periodic payments
prevent the judgment proceeds from being exhausted
177. Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd sub norn., Frankel
v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
178. Id.
179. The current statutory allowance in North Dakota for periodic payment of judgments
applies only to those judgments that are compromised. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-12.1-13 (Supp.
1985). The compromised judgments are effected by voluntary agreements between a political
subdivision and a judgment creditor. See id. S 32-12.1-12. The agreement provides that the political
subdivision pays less than the amount of the judgment. See id. The statutes provide that a political
subdivision may pay the compromised amount in annual installments over a twenty-five year period
at a maximum interest rate of five percent per year. See id. 5 32-12.1-13. The means by which a
political subdivision finances a judgment is through the issuance of bonds. See id. The political
subdivision levies a tax to pay the principal and interest on the bonds as they mature. See id. S 32-
12.1-14. North Dakota has a similar scheme for the periodic payment ofjudgments by cities. See id.
ch. 40-43.
In 1977 the legislature adopted a periodic payment provision as part of a comprehensive bill on
medical malpractice claims. Id. S 26-40.1-16 (1978) (repealed 1983). The section allowed the court to
enter a judgment ordering payments from a patient trust fund to the judgment creditor at regular
intervals. See id. Under the statute, the court specified the recipient of the payment, the time of the
payment, the interval between payments, and the total number of payments. See id.
The North Dakota Supreme Court declared chapter 26-40.1 unconstitutional in its entirety. See
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). The court concluded that, after striking down
particular sections of the chapter, the statute no longer could stand on its own. Id. at 138. The
unconstitutional sections addressed by the court in detail were 55 26-40.1-02, -03, -04, -07, and -08
of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 137; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-02, -03, -04, -07,
-08 (1978) (repealed 1983). The court raised no constitutional objection to S 26-40.1-16, the periodic
payment provision. A similar periodic payment provision is therefore likely to withstand
constitutional challenge.
180. See generally UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT
prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 20-22 (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter MODEL ACT].
181. See Sedgwick &Judge, The Use ofAnnuities in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 41 INS. COUNS.
J. 584, 584 (1974).
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prematurely."8 2 In addition, income tax considerations may make
periodic payment of judgments more palatable to the plaintiff. 8 3
While a lump sum award is not subject to taxation, interest earned
on the plaintiff's investment of those dollars is taxable as income to
the plaintiff. 8 4 By contrast, when a defendant invests the lump sum
award, the periodic interest payments made to the plaintiff are not
subject to taxation. 18 5
Legislation that directs the periodic payment of judgments is
likely to take one of two forms. First, the legislature could establish
a system that makes periodic payments mandatory when a
judgment reaches a designated amount. 86 Alternatively, the
legislature could establish a system that allows for a periodic
payment arrangement when requested by motion from one of the
parties. 187
Numerous considerations are important in drafting a statute
that authorizes political subdivisions to pay judgments in
installments. The statute should include provisions which ensure
that periodic payments are appropriate to any case in which
payments may be applied. Fairness dictates that the value of
damages already incurred by the plaintiff should be compensated at
the time of the judgment. Thus, installment payments should be
limited to unaccrued future damages.188 Periodic payments should
182. MODEL ACT, supra note 180, at 21.
183. Id. at 20-21.
184. Id.
185. Rev. Rul. 77-230, 1977-2 C.B. 214 (periodic payments from United States trust fund are
not subject to federal income tax); Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74 (periodic payments of an
agreed amount from an annuity purchased by the defendant are not subject to federal income taxes);
Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75 (same). These rulings of the Internal Revenue Service indicate
that periodic damage payments in personal injury cases should not be taxable. Congress placed its
stamp of approval on this position by amending § 104 of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26
U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984). The Internal Revenue Code now provides that the exclusion from gross
income for damages received for personal injury or sickness applies to periodic payment settlements.
See id.
When an investment is made to provide funds for periodic payments, a question arises whether
the entire amount of each payment qualifies for the exclusion just mentioned. If the judgment
creditor has actual or constructive receipt or economic benefit of the lump sum that is invested, the
interest earned on the investment may not qualify for the exclusion. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B.
74 (the corpus, but not the interest, is excluded); Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75 (same).
186. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619 (1985) (award for future damages exceeding
$100,000).
187. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a Model
Periodic Payment ofJudgments Act in 1980. MODEL ACT, supra note 180, at 22-42. Section 3 of the
Model Act provides that a party may make a motion to the court 60 days prior to trial with notice to
all parties. Id. S 3. By presenting the motion, the petitioner elects application of the Model Act. Id.
No state has adopted the Act as drafted by the commissioners. Several states have, however, adopted
some sort of periodic payment statute. Elligett, The Periodic Payment ofJudgents, 46 INs. CouNs. J.
130, 134& nn.l-13 (1979).
188. MODEL ACT, supra note 180, § 5 comment.
404
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION LIABILITY
only be allowed in cases in which a judgment is substantial.189
Legislation authorizing periodic payment of damages should also
provide a mechanism to adjust the amount of future payments for
inflation. 190
Finally, a judgment creditor receiving installment payments of
future damages has the right to be absolutely secure in the ability of
the judgment debtor to make future payments. 1 91 In all likelihood,
a political subdivision will continue in existence and have assets
sufficient to satisfy the future obligation of the judgment. A trial
court should be given the authority to require security guaranteeing
future performance in the event there is question concerning the
ability of the judgment debtor to make the future payments ordered
in the judgment. 192
Legislation that authorizes periodic payment of damages and
that also provides the judgment creditor the safeguards discussed
above, strikes a balance between the rights of the judgment creditor
and the legitimate concern of political subdivisions regarding their
ability to pay large judgments.
VII. CONCLUSION
The demise of local governmental immunity in North Dakota
increased the liability exposure of local political subdivisions.
Unfortunately, problems concerning the price and availability of
insurance accompanied this increase in exposure.' 93 The future
outlook for political subdivision liability need not remain dismal
however, with the consideration of the three proposals suggested in
this Article.
189. Id. 5 3 comment. The Model Act allows a party to unilaterally invoke the Act if future
damages will exceed $100,000. Id. S 3(3). Policy reasons that support periodic payment ofjudgments
lose credibility when applied to small awards because of the increased burden imposed upon courts to
maintain ongoing supervision of periodic payment cases. For a discussion of the policy behind
periodic payments, see supra text accompanying notes 180-85.
190. Id. S 7 comment. The Model Act requires yearly adjustment for inflation, based on the rate
of discount for United States treasury bills. Id. 5 7(b), (c).
191. Id. S8 comment.
192. See id. S 8 (requiring specified forms of security); id. 5 9 (allowing a court to order lump
sum payments if the judgment debtor fails to maintain security).
193. See Comment, supra note 2, at 561-62 (noting that because of expanding governmental
liability, insurance for municipalities is expensive and difficult to obtain).
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